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D R A F T

**ADWheelon:EF
(20 March 1965)**

1. In coordinating launching, tracking (and) recovery (processing) services, what authority does DNRO have?

Answer. He has whatever authority the SecDef elects to grant him. These activities--launching, tracking, and recovery--are clearly the responsibility of DOD, and we would hope that a single Air Force organization would be charged with this integrated responsibility. Depending on whether the SecDef prefers to consolidate or separate the coordinating role of the DNR and the line command of DOD elements of the NRP, he could exercise either a command or coordinating authority over such an organization.

Answer. With respect to film processing, we consider this to be primarily an intelligence function like NPIC, closely coupled to the (diverse) ways in which the photography is to be exploited.

NRO review(s)
completed.

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Like the SDC, the prescription of primary photographic processing at Eastman Kodak and production of duplicates for other consumers should be established by CIA. Because the backup photo processing facilities (Westover, field units) are DOD-sponsored activities, the DNR is charged with coordinating them with the primary activity at EK administered by CIA.

2. Is the consolidated budget simply a sum of CIA and DOD requests?

Answer. No. It will consist of the line items corresponding to the programs and functions approved by the ExCom. The organization which is assigned program or functional responsibility for such items will prepare and submit through the DNR the budgetary estimates for these items.

3. If the transfer of funds is in lump sums, is DNRO authorized not to transfer funds?

Answer. No. Once the ExCom has approved the NRP and corresponding budget, the DNR cannot unilaterally modify either the program or the funding level. If, as the year unfolds, he judges that

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modification--up or down--of the basic fiscal allocation is needed, he can propose this simultaneously to the ExCom. The operating agency will be requested to present its views on such changes to the ExCom.

---Under what conditions?

Answer. The budget can be modified at the initiative of the ExCom, DNR or operating Agency. The conditions will ordinarily correspond to coverage for supplemental programs approved after the basic budget is established, coverage for expanding operational requirements, coverage of overruns, turnback of underruns or uncommitted funds, turnback of funds for programs cancelled in mid-year.

---If no authority is given, why should not the funds be separately budgeted?

Answer. This makes considerable good sense and was the pattern up to FY 64. It places a premium on accurate forecasting, since transfer of funds between separate accounts in a single budget is probably simpler than transfer between separate budgets as was done in the early days of OXCART. However, the

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question is more fundamental than transfer facility and is really a natural consequence of the basic division, presentation, defense, and distribution of the "Black Budget."

4. What function would the DNRO fulfill in R&D?

Answer. He would coordinate such activities as a result of his full and complete access to such activities.

---Can he stop duplicative projects (or) choose among them?

Answer. No, not unilaterally. He can recommend such choice or cancellation to the ExCom. In the first instance, however, he would be expected to resolve such issues by mature coordination among the operating units and responsible officials of CIA and DOD. The measure of an effective staff officer is to reconcile such matters without appeal to higher authority, and the DNR would be judged by his success in resolving such problems short of the ExCom.

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5. What is meant by the payload?

Answer. That unit which performs the reconnaissance function. In the case of photographic systems--like CORONA, []--this includes the cameras, film, spacecraft, and reentry vehicles. In CORONA, all these elements are procured and assembled covertly by CIA. The division ~~XXXX~~ between payloads and booster or launch systems (procured openly) is thus a natural one. In the case of [] payloads, which are not recovered, like the [] satellites, the payload includes

[]

6. When a system is in its development phase, how can DNRO be made responsible for interfaces when he has no authority on one of the faces and undefined authority on the other?

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Answer. A valid point, which we would ~~clarify~~ clarify by changing the wording of the last sentence of Paragraph D-3 to read:

"The DNR will be responsible for establishing, facilitating and monitoring the interfaces between payload and booster organizations. He will refer any problems at these interfaces to the respective command elements for joint resolution.

---In addition, he will have no responsibility for the whole flight test (Article D-4).

Answer. Of course not. An individual flight test is a complex experiment, the planning of which extends back for nearly a year and the actual execution of which takes nearly a month of specific preparation, followed by exhaustive data reduction. The responsibility for such flights must fall to the responsible ~~the~~ engineering/program directors to whom such ~~the~~ flights on individual systems are a full-time job. To have a reconnaissance coordinator participate in such activities in any meaningful or constructive way would preclude by virtue of time conflict the discharge of his prime responsibility.

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7. In article E-1 it is stated that DNRO plays a "central role" in planning operational programs. What does planning mean?

Answer. The cited paragraph goes on to explain what is meant by planning on P. 8, viz.,

"It involves far-sighted budgeting for payload production as well as booster procurement and modification. It involves judicious scheduling of operational ~~W/A~~ launches from fixed resources, in addition to development flight tests. It requires a plan with sufficient flexibility to respond to changing world situations and the corresponding intelligence needs. It is a complex managerial task for which a single individual must in the last analysis be responsible."

This narrative description certainly suggests the type of responsibility associated with planning. Of course, specific terms of reference for the DNR should spell this out exactly. However, that specification again depends somewhat on the relationship the SecDef prefers to establish between the DNR and the operating elements of DOD--command or coordination. We have therefore described the function rather than the enabling legislation.

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(Para. 7 cont.)

How can the DNRO be responsible? What authority does he have? etc.

Answer. This again is a decision the DOD must make. However, it does remind us that a key paragraph is missing from the ~~data~~ narrative following E-4 and before E-5, which might read as follows:

"The DOD should fix the primary responsibility for conducting routine operational satellite firings in a single command element (probably SSD), which would include within its resources the necessary people, facilities and fiscal resources to launch, track, monitor and recover as necessary all satellite reconnaissance missions. It would be responsible for procuring, modifying and ~~data~~ launching all booster vehicles to provide necessary orbits for various reconnaissance payloads. It would track such vehicles in orbit through its facilities and operate a satellite tracking center where such data would be sent and consolidated. Telemetry from the orbiting payloads would be received and sent to the STC where representatives of the group responsible for

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developing and procuring the payload would monitor the operational status of the payload. A mission director for each flight would conduct such operations from this STC with the professional support of the payload group as is now done in CORONA. For instance, if the cameras were found to be malfunctioning, the payload group would recommend to the test director that the mission be recovered at the first opportunity. However, the decision to do so would belong to the mission director, who would command and direct the recovery forces."

The relationship of the DNR to this organization depends on whether (1) there is to be a separate Director of DOD reconnaissance activities with whom he would coordinate such activities, or (2) a direct command line is established between the DNR and the AF launching organization.

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8. Since there is no control on the content of RD programs except coordination (Article C-3), what prevents "hiding" of projects?

Answer. Paragraph C-3 itself answers this question, continuing as: "However, it is important that the DNR and ExCom receive each month a comprehensive report on the initiation, status, or conclusion of such efforts. In this way, competitive study efforts will be recognized, approved or discouraged, and synchronized for later decision actions."

Perhaps a provision can be devised which can ensure that these reports will not ^{fail} ~~fail~~ to mention "hidden projects." However, we would prefer to rely on the good will and integrity of responsible Government officials who would certify ~~the~~ the authenticity of such reports to the DNR and ExCom. Without this quality, one has no basis for an agreement of any kind.

9. Why should funds be allocated to each group in "like measure."

Answer. Several answers are possible. The most obvious is to assure a balanced competition at

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the edge of this technology, which is one of the principal reasons for retaining both CIA and DOD in the field. Of course, the approval of funding levels is the prerogative of the ExCom, and this provision was included to call specific attention to the present ~~unfavorable~~ situation wherein CIA is given virtually no funds for such activities and is thereby unable to provide a meaningful contribution to new developments. "Like measure" suggests a level consistent with "live participation," which is especially desirable on the frontier of reconnaissance.

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